Little is known about how lead banks in the syndicated loan market use their private information about loan quality. We formulate and test two opposing hypotheses, the Signaling Hypothesis and the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis. To measure private information, we use Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings, which are made comparable across lead banks using concordance tables. We fi nd that favorable private information is associated with higher loan retention by lead banks for term loans, ceteris paribus, consistent with the Signaling Hypothesis, while neither hypothesis dominates for revolvers. Differences in syndicate structure at least partially explain this disparity.
Introduction
Private information is the lifeblood of commercial banking. Banks are delegated by their depositors and other stakeholders to collect private information about potential borrowers to make informed credit decisions (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984) . Banks generate private information about their commercial loan customers by screening before loans are made, by monitoring borrowers after loans are made, and in some cases, from prior relationships that include both lending and other connections. In the traditional originate-to-hold model, in which banks keep loans they originate entirely on their balance sheets until maturity, it is well-known that banks use this private information in their present and future dealings with the borrowers.
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This model is typically used for small commercial loans.
In contrast, little is known about how private information is used in the alternative originate-to-distribute model, in which part or all of the loans banks originate are distributed to others. This model is often used for commercial loans for which no one bank provides all of the financing to reduce credit and/or liquidity risks, comply with capital requirements and/or legal lending limits, reduce funding cost disadvantages, or other reasons. 2 Rather, the lead bank distributes part of the loans to other banks and nonbank institutions through syndication. 3 This paper focuses on the syndicated loan market, which provides an ideal setting for studying private information for three reasons. First, syndicated loans comprise a multi-trillion 1 Pioneering contributions that establish that banks can use their private information to resolve informational frictions and increase the surplus generated by the bank-borrower relationship include Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) , Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) , and Thakor (1994, 2000) . Most studies using U.S. data tend to find benefits for borrowers, including lower cost, lower collateral requirements, and better access to credit (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995 ; for a review, see Degryse, Kim, and Ongena, 2009) , while a more limited literature finds benefits for the banks (e.g., Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007) . 2 Under legal lending limits, a U.S. bank generally cannot lend or otherwise expose more than 15% of its equity to any one borrower. This can increase to 25% if the addition is fully secured by readily marketable collateral. 3 There may be multiple lead arrangers, but our analysis focuses on a single lead bank. The Shared National Credit (SNC) database we use has only one self-identified lead bank. dollar market in which many firms are funded. Second, a broad spectrum of borrowing firms is represented -both public and private firms, with variety of different credit ratings as well as unrated firms, and many different firm sizes. Third and most important, direct measures of private information that may be made comparable across lead banks and loans have recently become available, allowing for meaningful regression analysis.
The literature on syndicated lending in some cases constructs indirect proxies for the extent of private information using publicly-available data, such as borrower's public listing status and public rating availability. For example, using such proxies, Sufi (2007) finds that lead bank loan retention is greater when the lead bank has more private information. It has recently become possible to go further by using direct comparable measures of the favorability of private information on individual loans made by a number of large lead banks using data provided to the Federal Reserve. These measures may indicate that the private information is favorable or unfavorable -i.e., the lead banks may view the loans as higher or lower quality than would be expected based on publicly-available information.
In this paper we ask: How do lead banks use their private information about loan quality in the syndicated loan market? In particular, we address how the favorability of the private information about loan quality affects the lead banks' retention of the loans. We focus on lead banks as opposed to syndicate participants who purchase parts of the loans, since lead banks generally do most of the screening and monitoring, and often have prior relationships with the borrowers. Thus, lead banks are likely the main repositories of the private information.
We formulate and test two hypotheses which are based on the knowledge of the lead banks relative to the syndicate participants and the extent to which these participants are able to divine the private information of the lead bank on loans of different quality. If participants are relatively uninformed about loans of any quality, the lead bank may have to signal the quality of the loans. Signaling is costly, but can be accomplished by the lead bank investing more of its own funds by retaining greater ownership. In equilibrium, the lead bank retains more of higherquality loans (Leland and Pyle, 1977) . Thus, under the Signaling Hypothesis, lead banks retain higher proportions of loans when they have more favorable private information, ceteris paribus. 4 Alternatively, syndicate participants may be relatively "sophisticated" and be able determine much of the private information about some of the loans. Assuming that the participants know more about the higher-quality loans than the lower-quality loans, they may demand more of the higher-quality loans about which they are better informed, ceteris paribus.
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The greater demand for higher-quality loans by participants results in lower retention of these loans remaining on the balance sheets of the lead banks. This is more likely to hold for syndicate participants that have built up loan evaluation expertise or "sophistication" through their own lead lender experience on other loans. In contrast to the Signaling Hypothesis, under the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis, lead banks retain lower proportions of loans when they have more favorable private information, ceteris paribus. Each hypothesis may hold for different subsets of syndicates, so we also test which hypothesis empirically dominates for different subsets of syndicates. Importantly, the extent to which the two hypotheses hold may also differ systematically by loan type. We run the tests separately for "pure" term loans (loans of fixed amounts with fixed maturities) and "pure" 4 The Signaling Hypothesis is analogous to some theories of collateral in which borrowers with favorable private information pledge collateral to signal their quality to differentiate themselves from lower-quality borrowers (e.g., Bester, 1985 Bester, , 1987 Thakor, 1987a, 1987b; Chan and Thakor, 1987; and Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991) . 5 The assumption that loan opacity and quality are inversely related is almost certainly true on average. For example, borrowers that are less opaque due to greater longevity, being publicly listed, and/or have bond ratings available tend to have loans that are safer than loans to younger, unlisted firms without bond ratings. revolvers (credits for which the borrower may draw down and repay any amount up to a fixed maximum as often as desired over the maturity of the agreement). 6 The pure term loans and revolvers have very different properties, and, as will be shown, very different syndicates that differ in their degree of "sophistication."
This separate treatment contrasts with most of the syndicated loan literature, which either includes term loans and revolvers in the same regressions or analyzes credits at the deal level (which may include both loan types). In either case, the studies often include a dummy for loan type, but generally do not allow the slope coefficients to differ. Our empirical results differ substantially for the two loan types and we obtain potentially misleading results when we combine them, justifying our separate treatment. We are able to find at least a partial explanation for the difference in results across loan types by examining syndicate structure.
The data requirements for testing these hypotheses are challenging. It is necessary to access lead banks' private information about loan quality. These data must also be made comparable across lead banks, which often use different internal rating scales. Fortunately, our dataset meets both requirements.
We use data on loan syndicates from the Shared National Credit (SNC) program. Banks participating in SNC provide regulators with "raw" internal loan ratings that reflect their private information about loan quality. Most of these banks do so on an annual basis, but a subset of 18 "expanded reporters" (described in Section 2) provide this information on a quarterly basis.
Since 2011:Q1, a total of 32 SNC banks -which includes most of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test banks plus a small number of other lead banks -also 6 As discussed further below, we delete "impure" loan types such as revolvers converting to term loans in order to have relatively clean samples of comparable loans.
provide concordance tables to the Federal Reserve (along with their Y14 reports). 7 We use these tables to map their "raw" internal loan ratings scale to the commonly-used Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating scale. To clarify, the concordance-mapped loan ratings are not S&P ratings, they simply use the same AAA, AA+, AA, AA-,… scale as S&P ratings. We use the concordancemapped internal loan ratings as lead banks' private information measures. Such usage is validated by evidence that these concordance-mapped ratings strongly predict loan default (Gutierrez-Mangas, Ivanov, Lueck, Luo, and Nichols, 2015) .
The 18 expanded reporters also provide detailed quarterly information on lead bank loan retention and syndicate structure for all the SNC loans for which these banks are either lead banks or participants. Thus, our sample includes comparable lead bank private information for all syndicates in which the lead bank is one of the 32 concordance banks and at least one of the 18 expanded reporters is either the lead bank or a participant. Our sample runs from 2011:Q1 through 2014:Q4.
We regress the proportion of the loan retained by the lead bank on the favorability of its private information about loan quality and a large number of controls and fixed effects, and we do so separately for pure term loans and pure revolvers. We use a strong set of controls because the concordance-mapped loan ratings are likely highly correlated with public information about loan quality, and we want the coefficients on the concordance-mapped ratings to reflect only the effects of private information. Our control variables include reported loss given default; regulatory risk ratings; loan characteristics; the market rank and condition of the lead bank; the 7 The Federal Reserve's CCAR assesses the capital adequacy of large, complex U.S. bank holding companies, and the practices used to manage their capital. The number of CCAR banks has generally increased over time. As of the early part of each year, there were 19 CCAR banks in 2011 and 2012, 18 in 2013, 30 in 2014, and 31 in 2015. strength of the lead bank-borrower relationship; borrower characteristics; and borrower public bond ratings. We also include fixed effects for borrower industry and time.
We find that for pure term loans, favorable private information is associated with higher loan retention by lead banks, consistent with the Signaling Hypothesis, while for pure revolvers, neither hypothesis empirically dominates. Further investigation suggests that at least part of the difference may be explained by the generally higher proportion of other concordance banks in the syndicates for pure revolvers. This result is intuitive, because the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis is more likely to hold when a greater proportion of syndicate participants may be able to divine at least some of the private information. Other concordance banks are generally large banks with screening and monitoring technologies that are superior to those of other parties, and are often lead banks and syndicate members on many other deals. Thus, these banks are more likely to be the type of "sophisticated" syndicate participants as described by the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis.
Our hypotheses have not been investigated in the extant literature. They cannot be addressed using the DealScan dataset, which most studies of the syndicated loan market use, since DealScan contains only publicly available information (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Bosch and Steffen, 2007; Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Sufi, 2007; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Drucker and Puri, 2009; Haselmann and Wachtel, 2011; Bharath, Dahiya, and Hallak, 2013; Firestone and Rezende, 2013; Bradley and Roberts, 2015) .
Other studies use the SNC dataset, but study issues other than lead bank loan retention, such as examiner-based loan ratings (Jones, Lang, and Nigro, 2005) , the quality of loan monitoring (Avery, Gaul, Nakamura, and Robertson, 2012) , the rise of the originate-to-distribute model (Bord and Santos, 2012) , firms' propensity to refinance (Mian and Santos, 2012) , the liquidity risk of banks (e.g., Bord and Santos, 2014) , banks' incentives to bias internallygenerated risk estimates (Plosser and Santos, 2014) , the effects of monetary policy on loan risk (Aramonte, Lee, and Stebunovs, 2015) , banks' use of credit default swaps versus loan sales (Hasan and Wu, 2015) , and the effect of non-bank lenders on loan renegotiations (Paligorova and Santos, 2015) .
Some of these SNC papers use raw probabilities of default (PDs) as reported by the banks as measures of private information, while investigating issues other than lead bank loan retention (e.g., Plosser and Santos, 2014; Aramonte, Lee, and Stebunovs, 2015) . A drawback of this approach is that raw PDs may not be comparable across banks, since they are not matched to a common scale. We argue that concordance-mapped internal loan ratings are superior to PDs for other reasons as well. In one of our analyses below, we attempt to improve on the raw PDs by replacing them with concordance PDs using the mean probability of default across all sample loans with the same granular loan rating assigned to each loan with that rating.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology, data, and regression variables. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Methodology, data, and regression variables
This section describes our methodology, data, and regression variables.
Methodology
To examine how the favorability of the lead bank's private information affects the proportion of the loan it retains, we use the following regression setup: Time FE t + ε i,j,k,t (1)
The dependent variable is the proportion of loan i retained by lead bank j to borrower k in quarter t in which the loan is originated. The key independent variables capture the bank's private information favorability and are measured by concordance-mapped loan ratings in our main specification, discussed further in Section 2.3.2. Because such ratings are likely highly correlated with publicly-available information about loan quality, we include a strong set of controls to try to ensure that the coefficients on the loan ratings reflect only the effects of the private information. Equation (1) includes several sets of control variables (described in Section 2.3.3): loss given default, regulatory loan risk ratings, loan characteristics, bank reputation, bank condition, relationship strength, borrower characteristics, borrower industry fixed effects, borrower public ratings, and time fixed effects.
Our focus is on B 1 , which measures the net effect of the two competing hypotheses.
Under the Signaling Hypothesis, the B 1 coefficients are more positive for more favorable ratings (i.e., the lead bank keeps more when it has more favorable private information), while under the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis, the B 1 coefficients are more negative for more favorable ratings (i.e., the lead bank keeps less when it has more favorable private information).
Sample banks and loans
The Shared National Credit (SNC) program was set up by bank regulators in 1977 to provide an efficient and consistent review of the largest syndicated loans.
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The lead bank reports detailed information on loans that meet certain criteria. The rules changed considerably in December 2009 for 18 banks transitioning to adopt Basel II.
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These banks were designated as "expanded reporters," and have been required to report more information on a quarterly basis since then. Table 1 highlights differences in reporting requirements of SNC basic reporters and expanded reporters. Important for our purposes, the expanded reporter information contains data on all SNC syndicates for which these expanded reporters are either lead banks or participants.
From 2011:Q1 onward, 32 lead banks have been required to submit concordance tables along with their Y14 reports. These tables can be used to make "raw" internal loan ratings comparable across lead banks.
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Because our tests require information on the syndicates from the SNC expanded reporters dataset and internal loan ratings which are standardized using the concordance tables, our sample contains loan syndicates for which the lead bank is one of the 32 concordance banks and at least one of the 18 expanded reporters is either the lead bank or a participant.
The SNC database includes information on different types of term loans, lines of credit (revolvers and non-revolving credit lines), and other loans. As discussed above, to facilitate apples-to-apples comparisons, we focus on pure term loans (3,057 cases) and pure revolvers (6,477 cases) in our main regressions and eliminate other types of term loans, revolvers, and other loans.
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As will be shown, when all the syndicated loans are pooled, as is common in the syndicated loan literature, potentially misleading findings occur. 
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Regression variables
Dependent variable
The dependent variable used to test the hypotheses is the proportion of the loan retained by the lead bank at the end of the quarter of origination. Since sample banks are required to report data on a consolidated basis, we aggregate each bank's loan proportion up to the highest holder in the bank holding company (BHC) and assign that as the lead bank's total exposure for that loan.
This avoids artificial drops in loan retention that might arise if one entity formally acts as the lead arranger while another entity in the same BHC takes part of the loan on its books. 
Key independent variables
The key independent variables capture the lead bank's private information favorability about the loan. In most tests, we use a concordance-mapped rating -the bank's raw internal rating converted to the S&P scale using the bank's concordance table. Three hypothetical concordance tables are given in Table 3 Panels A, B, and C, which illustrate some of the variation in the raw ratings scales and how they map into the S&P scale. In reality, there are many more different Third, we use a combination of the loan's raw PD (if available) and a concordance PD, the average PD of sample loans with the same loan rating (if available) calculated using the concordance tables. This approach allows us to assign a PD to far more loans (89 percent of the term loans and 98 percent of the revolvers). The concordance PD and the mixed case are intended to improve upon the raw PD by making them more comparable across lead banks and more often available.
Control variables
Loss given default (LGD) variables. We include the loan's expected LGD as provided by the bank and a dummy = 1 if the LGD is available.
LGD is not necessarily comparable across banks, since banks may differ in their degree of conservatism.
LGD information is only available for 55% of the pure term loans and 71 percent of the revolvers. The dummy accounts for the average difference in loan retention between banks that have LGD available and those 14 It is critical to our tests that the standardized loan ratings are not only comparable across lead banks, but that they are confidential to these banks. Otherwise, they would not be private information for which our hypotheses are relevant. The internal ratings are proprietary information and cannot be shared with others, so the information is confidential.
that do not. Inclusion of the dummy ensures that observations with missing information do not drop out of the regressions.
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Regulatory risk ratings. Banks are required by regulators to assign loans to one or more of five regulatory risk ratings: (1) pass: no potential weaknesses that may lead to future repayment problems or the bank holds the loan in a for-sale or trading account; (2) special mention: potential weaknesses that may lead to future repayment problems; (3) substandard:
inadequately protected and there is a distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some future losses; (4) doubtful: inadequately protected and repayment in full is highly questionable; and (5) loss: uncollectable. These ratings are reviewed by regulators during bank examinations and adjusted if the regulator does not agree with the bank's assessment. The five variables capture the proportion of a loan that is assigned to each category, although in most cases, the entire loan is assigned to just one category. One category must be omitted from the regressions to avoid perfect collinearity. We omit Pass because the other categories are less frequently used around the origination date.
Loan characteristics. We include the natural log of facility size ($ million), the natural log of maturity, and five loan purpose variables (general corporate, acquisition financing, debt refinancing, working capital, and other (omitted from regressions to avoid perfect collinearity). Bank condition variables. To control for bank condition, we include the equity capital ratio, a bank liquidity ratio, and the allowance for loan and lease losses ratio. These are measured at the highest holder level (i.e., the highest BHC to which a lead arranger belongs), because the proportion of the loan retained variables are also measured at this level. For domestic BHCs, data are obtained from the Consolidated Statements for Holding Companies (FR-Y9C). For foreign banking organizations, we use quarterly financial reports from Bloomberg, since the FR-Y9C has only the U.S. information of these organizations.
Relationship strength. To measure relationship strength, we focus on the SNC loans obtained by the borrower in the previous five years. If all of those loans were provided by the same lead bank, as long as it has at least one prior loan, the bank-borrower relationship is considered strong.
Borrower characteristics. We include leverage, profitability, and size of the borrower.
The SNC database does not include borrower characteristics, so this information is only available for publicly-traded firms from Compustat for domestic firms and from Bloomberg for foreign firms.
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We also include a dummy if the firm is publicly traded.
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Borrower public ratings. We use coarse or granular senior public debt ratings, corresponding with whether the concordance-mapped internal loan ratings are coarse or granular, respectively. We also add a borrower debt rating available flag.
Regression results
This section tests our hypotheses, presents robustness checks, and shows some additional results. (1) includes as controls only the other private information variables -the loss given default variables plus regulatory risk ratings. Subsequent columns add loan characteristics (Column (2)), the lead bank's market rank (Column (3)), plus the lead bank's condition (Column (4)), plus bankborrower relationship strength (Column (5)), plus borrower characteristics and industry fixed effects (Column (6)), plus borrower public debt ratings (Column (7)). In the interest of brevity, time and borrower industry fixed effects and data availability flags for loss given default, borrower publicly listed, and publicly rated are not shown. Panel C includes only full specifications, replicating Column (7) from Panels A and B for easy comparison of pure term loans and pure revolvers with the full specification for all syndicated loans combined.
Main results using the coarse loan ratings
The results from Table 4 Panel A suggest that lead banks tend to keep more of pure term loans when they have favorable private information, controlling for other factors, consistent with the Signaling Hypothesis. The loan rating coefficients suggest that lead banks retain more of rated loans than non-rated loans, the omitted base category, across all specifications. Among the rated loans, they also generally retain more of those that are more highly rated. In Column (7) with all of the control variables included, the effects are monotonic and all of the coefficients are statistically significant -the higher the private loan rating, the higher the loan retentionproviding statistically significant evidence in favor of the empirical dominance of the Signaling Hypothesis. The results are also economically significant. The coefficient of 0.078 on LOANRATINGHIG in Column (7) suggests that banks hold 7.8% more of the loans with the highest private rating relative to unrated loans, raising the retention rate by almost one-third when evaluated at the mean of 25% shown in Table 2 Panel B. The difference between the highest and the lowest of the rated loans -i.e., the difference between the coefficients on LOANRATINGHIG and LOANRATINGLSG -is also a statistically and economically significant 4.0% (0.78 -0.38).
Looking next at the results for pure revolvers in Table 4 Panel B, there are no statistically or economically significant effects of the coarse loan ratings variables on lead bank loan retention in the full specification in column (7), consistent with neither the Signaling Hypothesis nor the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis dominating for pure revolvers. The only private loan ratings that are statistically or economically significant are in Column (1), which has the fewest control variables, and these coefficients are not mutually consistent.
It is not surprising that we find very different results for pure term loans and pure revolvers, both because they are such different types of credit, and because their syndicate structures are quite different. For example, as shown in Table 2 Panel B, pure term loan syndicates have a mean and median of 36% and 33%, respectively, of other concordance banks as participants, versus 52% and 56%, respectively, for pure revolver syndicates. Thus, the syndicate participants for the revolvers may be thought of as generally more "sophisticated" than participants on term loans because of their greater experience as lead banks on other syndicates.
We investigate further below whether this difference in syndicate structure may help explain the differences in results between term loans and revolvers.
Turning to the effects of the control variables on pure term loan retention in Table 4 Panel A Column (7). LOANLGD has a negative, but only marginally statistically significant coefficient, suggesting a lower retention of lower quality loans, consistent with the results for loan ratings. Similarly, the two worst regulatory risk ratings are also negative and statistically significant, suggesting that lead banks retain less of lowest quality loans (recall that PASS is the excluded base case). Loan size has a negative effect, possibly because the lead bank more often runs into concentration risk problems or legal lending limits for larger loans, and is therefore able to retain less of them. Lead banks also appear to retain less of long-maturity loans, possibly because they are riskier, ceteris paribus. The coefficients of the loan purpose variables are all negative and statistically significant, suggesting that lead banks retain more of "other" loans, which is difficult to interpret. Banks that are in the top three in the league tables retain less of term loans, possibly because their ranking assures syndicate members of loan quality, reducing the amount they need to hold to signal loan quality. Lead banks with higher liquidity ratios retain more of the loans, possibly reflecting more capacity to keep loans on the balance sheet.
Banks with more loan loss reserves retain much more of the loans they originate, possibly because high reserves hurt their reputations for making quality loans, reducing demand. If the lead bank has a strong relationship with the borrower, the bank retains less, possibly because of a certification effect of the quality of the loan. Borrower characteristics have no significant effects, but very high borrower public debt ratings result in greater loan retention by the lead banks. This last result highlights the importance of including a strong set of controls in the regressions. Controlling for public ratings in the regressions allows us to interpret the effects of banks' internal ratings as reflecting the effects of private information, rather than public information that is correlated with the private information.
Most of the control variable results are similar for revolvers in Panel B Column (7), but there are notable exceptions. Fewer of the loan purpose variables are significant. The lead bank condition variables suggest that those with higher capital ratios retain more, rather than the more liquid banks, although the logic behind the findings is essentially the same. Borrower size becomes negative and statistically significant, but small in magnitude, and the borrower public rating variables are mixed.
As indicated, Panel C shows the full specification when including all of the syndicated loans in Column (3) compared with the pure term loans and pure revolvers in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. Column (3) shows a regression with 12,011 total loan observations, almost four times as many as the pure term loans in Column (1), yet the findings for the full loan sample are largely dominated by the pure term loan subsample. The coefficients on the loan ratings are all positive and statistically and economically significant for the full sample in Column (3), and generally declining as the favorability of the private information decreases, consistent with the pure term loan results. This suggests that if we had followed the usual procedure of including all the loans in our main tests, we would have concluded that the Signaling Hypothesis was dominant overall, which is not correct for the pure revolvers, which account for most of the loans. Moreover, our analysis below in which we analyze the effects of differences in the "sophistication" of the syndicates for pure term loans and pure revolvers that appears to explain at least part of the differences in results across the two loan types would not be possible without the separate samples for them.
Robustness check excluding unrated loans
As a robustness check, in Table 5 , we rerun the main regressions, but exclude loans that are not rated and substitute the low sub-investment grade loan ratings as the omitted base category. For brevity, we show only the coefficients for the concordance-mapped internal loan ratings and suppress the coefficients on the controls. The results are again statistically and economically significant. The coefficient on LOANRATINGHIG in the full specification for term loans in Table 5 Panel A is a statistically significant 0.043. This suggests that lead banks retain 4.3% more of loans rated as high investment grade than low sub-investment grade, ceteris paribus, almost the same as the 4.0% difference between the high investment grade and low subinvestment grade coefficients in the main specification in Table 4 Panel A. The LOANRATINGHIG coefficient in the full specification for term loans in Table 5 Panel B is a statistically insignificant 0.005, almost the same as the 0.007 difference between the high investment grade and low sub-investment grade coefficients in the main specification in Table 4 Panel B.
Robustness check using granular loan ratings
For robustness, we next show loan retention results using granular loan ratings. Table 6 Panels A and B show the findings for pure term loans and pure revolvers, respectively. The results are largely consistent with those for the coarse ratings in Table 4 . In Panel A, all of the ratings from AAA to B are positive and -with the sole exception of the AA rating, which makes up only one percent of the observations -they are statistically significant and monotonically decreasing.
These results support the main findings and are again consistent with Signaling Hypothesis dominating for pure term loans. The lower ratings -all of which have one percent or fewer of the observations -are somewhat mixed. In Panel B, none of the loan ratings have statistically significant coefficients, with the sole exception of the marginally significant CC rating, which represents less than one percent of the observations. Again, the findings suggest that neither hypothesis empirically dominates for pure revolvers. In the remainder of the results, we focus on the coarse ratings because there are very few observations in some of the granular ratings categories.
Additional implication of the hypotheses and a partial explanation for the differences in results between term loans and revolvers
An additional implication of the hypotheses is that the informational opacity problem is that the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis is more likely to hold when there is a larger share of concordance banks among the syndicate participants. This is because these banks by virtue of their experiences as lead banks on other syndicates may be better able to discern more of the private information of the lead bank than other participants and therefore demand more of the loans with favorable private information. In contrast, the Signaling Hypothesis is more likely to hold when dealing with a smaller proportion of concordance banks, since informational opacity is likely more severe and requires a greater use of signaling.
As discussed above, the mean and median concordance bank proportions of syndicate participants are much higher for revolver syndicates -52% and 56%, respectively -than for term loan syndicates -36% and 33%, respectively. This raises the possibility that these differences may partially explain our main finding that the Signaling Hypothesis tends to dominate for pure term loans while neither hypothesis dominates for pure revolvers. That is, the Signaling Hypothesis may empirically dominate for pure term loans because the typical syndicate for these loans is relatively uninformed and requires the lead bank to retain more of the better loans to signal their quality, while for pure revolvers, there are typically more sophisticated syndicates with more concordance banks that demand more of the better loans, offsetting the signaling effect so that neither hypothesis empirically dominates.
To address this in a more substantive manner, we rerun our full specification main regressions from Table 4 Panels A and B Columns (7) while adding Concordance bank proportion LOW and HIGH dummies for whether the concordance bank proportion is less than or equal to the median for pure term loans of 0.33 and higher than the median for revolvers of 0.56, respectively. The findings are shown in Table 7 Panels A and B for pure term loans and pure revolvers, respectively. In both columns, the interaction terms with the LOW dummy are all positive, and the interaction terms with the HIGH dummy are all negative, and in most cases, these terms are statistically significant. This suggests that for both types of loans, the Signaling Hypothesis empirically dominates for syndicates with small proportions of other concordance banks, and the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis empirically dominates when other concordance banks have large shares. Thus, in our main results, the Signaling Hypothesis may dominate for pure term loans while the two hypotheses cancel each other out for pure revolvers because of the difference in the proportions of concordance banks in the syndicates for the two loan samples.
Extra analysis using probabilities of default (PDs) as alternative measures of private information
The existing literature sometimes measures banks' private information using probabilities of default (PDs) instead of the banks' internal loan ratings and focuses on topics other than lead banks' loan retention. The main reason for using PDs is that until recently, concordance tables that allow one to consistently compare banks' internal ratings were not available. We now examine whether using PDs yield similar results to our method of using concordance-mapped internal loan ratings. Table 8 shows the results based on three alternative proxies for the loan's PD, using both linear models of PD and quadratic models that include both PD and PD suggests that for pure term loans, lead banks retain more of the loans with unfavorable private information. This is consistent with the dominance of the Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis and in direct conflict with our finding of consistency with the Signaling Hypothesis when using the concordance-mapped loan ratings. In the other models with the concordance PD and the mixed case, the results show insignificant coefficients in the linear models and conflicting coefficients in the quadratic models, which do not support our main findings, but are in less conflict with them. The reduced conflict with our main findings is expected, given that the concordance PDs are at least partially comparable across lead banks. The findings in Panel B
suggest that neither hypothesis empirically dominates for pure revolvers, consistent with our main results, but it is hard to draw strong conclusions from what are essentially non-results.
We strongly prefer our concordance-mapped loan ratings to the PDs because of the comparability across lead banks. In addition, the concordance-mapped ratings have multiple categories and do not force a linear or quadratic functional form on the effects of private information favorability. The loan ratings also incorporate more dimensions of credit risk -such as the likelihood of late payments, restructuring, and renegotiation costs -as well as the probability of default.
Conclusion
In the syndicated loan market, lead banks generate private information about loan quality, but little is known about how they use this information in their interactions with other syndicate members. We formulate and test hypotheses about how the favorability of the private information about loan quality affects the proportion of the loan retained by the lead bank, differentiating between pure term loans and pure revolvers. We employ concordance tables that map individual banks' internal loan ratings scales into a standardized scale so that comparable data can be used to test the hypotheses.
We find that for pure term loans, favorable private information is associated with higher loan retention by lead banks, consistent with the Signaling Hypothesis, while for pure revolvers, neither hypothesis empirically dominates. We further investigate why the results may differ for the two types of loans, and find that at least part of the difference may be explained by the higher proportions of concordance banks -banks which are often lead banks on other loans -in the syndicates for pure revolvers. We also find that the standardized internal loan ratings have advantages over the probabilities of default (PDs) that are sometimes used as measures of private information in the literature. This table examines if banks retain more or less of the loan when their private information is favorable. It regresses the proportion of the loan retained on our key private information variables, i.e., the concordance-mapped internal loan ratings proxies, and alternative sets of control variables. The main results presented here are based on coarse loan ratings. Panel A focuses on pure term loans; Panel B is based on pure revolvers. The columns of each of these panels contain progressively more control variables to demonstrate robustness, with the full specifications in Columns (7). Panel C Columns (1) and (2) replicate Column (7) from Panels A and B for easy comparison of pure term loans and pure revolvers to the full specification in Column (3) that includes including all syndicated loans (pure and impure term loans, lines of credit, and other loans) in the same regression, with additional dummies for pure term loans and pure revolvers. All variables are defined in Table 3 Panel A. All regressions include time fixed effects (not shown for brevity). The data availability dummies, LOANLGDAVAIL, BORROWERPUBLIC, and BORROWRATINGAVAIL flags, are included in the appropriate regressions to account for the average difference in loan retention between banks that have LGD, corporate borrower information, and borrower public ratings available, respectively, and those that do not.. These are not reported for brevity. The last two columns of Panels A and B also include industry fixed effects (not shown for brevity). t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Main regression results -Pure term loans Table 4 . We rerun the full specification regressions from Columns (7) of Table 4 Panels A and B excluding loans that are not rated and using the low sub-investment grade loan ratings (LOANRATINGLSG) as the omitted base category. We regress the proportion of the loan retained on our key private information variables, i.e., the concordancemapped internal loan ratings proxies (with LOANSRATINGLSG omitted), and the full set of control variables. The robustness check results presented here are based on coarse loan ratings. Panel A focuses on term loans, Panel B on revolvers. All variables are defined in Table 6 : Robustness check using granular (instead of coarse) loan ratings
Like Table 4 , this table examines if banks retain more or less of the pure term loans and pure revolvers when their private information is favorable. It regresses the proportion of the loan retained on our key private information variables, i.e., the concordance-mapped internal loan ratings proxies, and the full set of control variables. The robustness check presented here uses granular loan ratings instead of the coarse loan ratings used in Table 4 . Panel A focuses on pure term loans, Panel B contains pure revolvers. All variables are defined in Both regressions replace the uninteracted coarse concordance-mapped internal loan ratings used in prior tables with dummies indicating whether the proportion of concordance banks is low (≤ 0.33, the median for the pure term loan sample) , medium (> 0.33 but ≤ 0.56, the medium for the revolver sample), or high (> 0.56, the median for the pure revolver sample) and the four coarse concordance-mapped internal loan ratings interacted with these dummies. The regressions also include all the control variables included in Table 4 Column (7) (not shown for brevity). All variables are defined in Table 3 Panel A. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This table examines if banks retain more or less of the loan when their private information is favorable. It regresses the proportion of the loan retained on three alternative sets of PD variables (instead of the concordance-mapped internal loan ratings). Panel A shows pure term loans, and Panel B shows pure revolvers. In each panel, Columns (1) and (2) show the linear and quadratic functional forms for the loan's raw PD as reported by the bank, the measure used in the literature. The other columns focus on measures we construct to make the PDs more comparable across banks. Columns (3) and (4) use the concordance tables to assign the average PD of similarly-rated loans in the sample (if available) to every loan in the sample. Columns (5) and (6) use the loan's raw PD (if available) and use the concordance tables to assign the average PD of similarly-rated loans in the sample (if available) to the remaining loans. The regressions also include a dummy for if PD information is available and all control variables included in Table 4 Column (7) (not shown for brevity). All variables are defined in Table 3 Panel A. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
